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Abstract 
 
While numerous Western countries first experienced cultural rationalization, 
next economic modernization, and then faced the challenges of population aging and 
pension policy reform, both Latin America and China, in contrast, are dealing with 
these challenges in the context of much less developed economies and stronger 
traditional cultures. In this article we analyze old-age pension reform efforts in eight 
Latin American countries that have introduced funded defined contribution schemes 
with individual accounts. We are searching for insights about the potential success of 
similar reforms being implemented in China. All of these societies are organized 
primarily around the principles of family, reciprocity, loyalty and poverty. Our analysis 
suggests that these distinctive characteristics have important implications for the likely 
success of the reforms currently being implemented in China, particularly in four 
interrelated areas: coverage, compliance, transparency, and fiscal stability.  
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1. Introduction 
Latin America is a pioneer with respect to the shift from old-age pension 
schemes based on pay-as-you-go (PAYG) defined benefit models to schemes based all 
or in part on funded individual accounts. In 1981 Chile became the first nation to make 
the shift with the introduction of mandatory fully-funded privately managed individual 
retirement accounts (IRAs). Today there are 12 Latin American countries that have 
shifted to schemes influenced by the Chilean model (Gill et al. 2005; Kritzer 2005). 
On the opposite side of the earth, China is following a similar path, though the 
Chinese IRAs are currently publicly managed and remain largely unfunded (Jackson 
and Howe 2004).  Since 1995 China has introduced a number of reforms, the most 
important of which were promulgated in 1997 and 2000.  By 2025, one quarter of the 
world’s population aged 60 and over will be living in China (UN 2004). For this reason 
the success or failure of the reform of China’s old-age pension system will affect a 
major proportion of the world’s elderly population (Williamson and Shen 2004). 
In many respects the reforms in China have not been working out as had been 
intended. The major problems faced by the old-age pension reform in Latin America 
appear again in the newly introduced reforms in China. These problems include low 
coverage and compliance rates, poor transparency, and serious fiscal difficulties. 
Our analysis tries to obtain insights about the potential consequences of reforms 
currently being introduced in China based on evidence from eight Latin American 
countries —Argentina, Bolivia, Chile, Colombia, El Salvador, Mexico, Peru and 
Uruguay— that introduced some form of funded IRAs (partial privatization) between 
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1981 and 1998. Four other countries —Costa Rica, the Dominican Republic, Ecuador, 
and Nicaragua— are not included because their reforms are so new, because they are 
not yet fully implemented, or due to the lack of information. 
Many differences can be found between the Latin American countries, and 
perhaps even more between them and China. For example, Latin American countries 
have undergone a variety of political regimes, but none of them has been close to 
Chinese communism. Differences acknowledged, our analysis emphasizes the major 
cultural and economic factors shared by the countries analyzed. We argue that the eight 
selected Latin American countries and China are strong traditional cultures and low-
income economies characterized by the centrality of: (1) the family, (2) reciprocal 
relationships, (3) rules of loyalty, and (4) poverty. Our analysis highlights the role of 
these factors in shaping the unfolding of the pension reform process with respect to four 
areas: (1) coverage, (2) compliance, (3) transparency, and (4) fiscal stability. The role of 
the cultural and economic factors considered in this article has been largely overlooked 
in the literature on pension reform. Much of this literature focuses on political factors, 
such as the welfare state, communism, and the World Bank policies (e.g. Esping-
Andersen 1996; Fox 1997; Frazier 2004; Myles and Pierson 2001). 
In this article our focus is on Latin America and China, but we find it essential 
to make some comparisons with the Western European nations.  The latter will be 
characterized as rationalized cultures and affluent economies displaying centrality of: 
(1) the institutions supporting elderly, (2) individual financial planning, (3) legality, and 
(4) wealth.  Although a detailed analysis of Western European countries is beyond the 
scope of this paper, the comparison has important advantages. A comparative 
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perspective calls attention to the factors shared by Latin America and China. In 
addition, the Western European nations constitute a reference point that can be used to 
provide all observers with a common frame through which to assess the pension reform 
in Latin America and from which to speculate about some of the challenges China will 
face in connection with pension changes currently being implemented. But above all, 
the comparison to Western European nations helps to uncover some of the underlying 
assumptions of these pension reforms that do not entirely hold for Latin America and 
China. In a somewhat oversimplified formulation, these assumptions are: (1) 
preeminence of formal-institutional support systems of the elderly, (2) emphasis on 
individual responsibility for financial planning, (3) zealous attachment to the law, and 
(4) perception of old-age poverty as an isolated problem. Formulated in a more general 
way, we will argue that the reforms fail to account for some of the major cultural and 
economic characteristics shared by Latin America and China. 
Figure 1 and Table 1 provide a brief summary of a number of key points that we 
have briefly introduced above, but more importantly they also serve as guide to much of 
the analysis which follows.  
[Insert Figure 1 about here] 
[Insert Table 1 about here] 
 
2. Modernization pathways 
Population aging and with it the associated problems of reforming the old-age 
pension systems are taking place around the world. However, the challenge of pension 
policy reform is context-specific. In Latin America and China, this challenge is framed 
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in the context of a traditional culture and low income economy. This claim should be 
understood in relative or comparative terms: Latin America and China contrasted to the 
Western European nations.  
In this section we will use the construct “modernization pathway” to describe 
broad historical transformations of the culture and the economy that precede the old-age 
pension reform and are common to a number of countries. We will consider two 
modernization pathways, one that fits a number of Western European nations and a 
second which better fits China and Latin America. Both can be viewed as Weberian 
ideal types (Weber [1903-1917] 1949; [1947] 1958). They are not meant to correspond 
to all of the characteristics of any particular country, but rather to highlight common 
elements that play an important role in the pension policy reform acceptance and 
effectiveness. 
The Western Pathway is limited here to the Western European countries, though 
it may be —carefully— extended to a few Western countries outside Western Europe. 
Southern European countries (e.g. Spain, Portugal and Italy) are more culturally similar 
to Latin America and for this reason were excluded from the pathway described here. 
The United States was also excluded because its exceptionalism adds unnecessary 
complexity to the typology (Lipset 1996). However, the United States shares many 
characteristics of the Western European nations and is also influencing the pension 
reform in Latin America and China, as proponents of world system and dependency 
theories have pointed out repeatedly (Wallerstein 2004). 
Culture is one important domain where the Pathway of Latin America and China 
differs from the Western Pathway (Figure 1). Latin America and China are both facing 
  
6
the challenge of population aging for their pension systems in the context of much 
stronger traditional cultures than found in the West. The Western Pathway, in contrast, 
is characterized by a deeply rationalized culture. According to Max Weber ([1921] 
1968), the process of rationalization tends to foster and to be associated with 
secularization and the view that everything is explainable by reason, at least in principle 
(Giddens 1971; Kalberg 1994; Lash and Whimster 1987). In behavioral terms, 
rationality involves a second meaning: greater reliance on means-ends calculations 
designed to organize activity so as to more efficiently reach a particular goal. 
One indicator of the level of rationalization in a society is a strong and uncorrupt 
formal legal system which fosters a social order based in large measure on laws, not just 
traditional cultural practices. Figure 2 suggests that corruption levels are lower in 
Western European countries than in China and in most Latin American countries. 
Although a traditional culture may have a formal legal system, the social order may be 
less based on these laws than in Western countries (Sandholtz and Taagepera 2005; 
Treisman 2000).  In China, for example, if there is a dispute between two families, 
rather than engage lawyers and courts, people may turn to spirit-mediums, respected in 
the community, familiarized with the parties involved and local history, and thus 
qualified to suggest solutions that are acceptable to both sides (Adler 2002).  Such 
evidence suggests that China and Latin America have not undergone as profound a 
rationalization process as have the Western European nations. 
[Insert Figure 2 about here] 
Economy is a second important domain where the Pathway for Latin America 
and China differs from the Western Pathway (Figure 1). In contrast to Western 
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countries, Latin America and China are also facing the challenge of rapid population 
aging before reaching high levels of national income. Despite rapid economic growth 
since the early 1980s, China is still a poor country. In 2001, more than 16 percent of the 
Chinese population was living on less than one dollar per day (World Bank 2003). In 
Latin America, one-fifth of the total population lives in extreme poverty and almost half 
in poverty (ECLAC 2004). Figure 3 illustrates the recent trends in Gross Domestic 
Product (GDP) per capita of the Western Pathway in comparison to the trends for China 
and Latin America. While this data covers a very recent time period, it is consistent 
with and lends support to the Weberian idea that in Western Europe the rationalization 
process is followed by a prosperous capitalist economic development. 
[Insert Figure 3 about here] 
Summing up, only after becoming rational and affluent societies do the Western 
countries start facing the challenge of a rapid population aging and the associated need 
for pension system reform. Clearly this is not the case of Latin America and China, 
which have much stronger traditional cultures and have not yet reached the Western 
European level of economic development (Figure 1). However, these distinctive 
characteristics have received little attention in the design of pension reforms or in 
efforts to evaluate the efficacy of these reforms in Latin America and China (Gill et al. 
2005; Holzman and Hinz 2005; Mesa-Lago 2005; Williamson and Deitelbaum 2005; 
World Bank 1994; 1997). 
Many have argued that religion is one of the most important factors explaining 
the differences between Western Europe and China and Latin America (Cousiño 1990; 
Cousiño and Valenzuela 1994; Morandé 1984; Weber [1916] 1951; [1921] 1963; 
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[1904-1905] 2002). Chinese Confucianism and Latin American Marianism —the 
Catholic adoration of the Virgin Mary— have been said to lack the elements central to 
the Protestant ethic that would bring about an early and profound rationalization process 
and capitalist development. 
Max Weber posed the question: Why did the modern West develop the way it 
did, and why did China not develop at the same time and in the same way as the West? 
He focused on a number of factors that distinguish European modernization from that of 
China arguing, for example, that Western European countries were characterized by the 
separation of the productive enterprise from the household, while China was organized 
on the basis of extended kinship clans (Weber [1927] 1961). But the most important 
difference Weber ([1916] 1951; [1921] 1963; [1904-1905] 2002) highlights is that 
between European Protestantism and Chinese Confucianism. Protestantism is based on 
an ethic that prompts an active attitude to change the world and places an emphasis on 
the individual. Confucianism is an ethic of adjustment to the world; it accepts things as 
they are and promotes a contemplative, mystical and passive attitude that tends to 
prolong ancient traditions. In this sense, Confucianism lacks the active tension that 
exists between Protestant religion and the world. That is, it lacked a “mentality” or 
“moral energy” suited for the early emergence of modern capitalism and a rationalized 
social order. 
Similarly to Weber’s comparison of Confucianism to Protestantism, Latin 
American Sociologists contrast Marianism with Protestantism (Cousiño 1990; Cousiño 
and Valenzuela 1994; Morandé 1984). The “ethic” of Marianism is that of grace and 
mercy rather than individual merit and responsibility. Mary is viewed as a mother-like 
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figure with compassionate attitude towards offenders and willingness to grant favors. 
She recompenses devotion with clemency and unmerited divine concessions. 
Accordingly, Marianism —as is the case with Confucianism— lacks the “moral energy” 
that would bring about a profound rationalization process and early capitalist 
development. 
Note that this is an historical argument. Hence, we are not arguing that China or 
Latin America can not develop (or will not at some point in the future) a rationalized 
culture or modern capitalism; rather, we are arguing that they did not do so before and 
in the same way as the West. Actually, between the 1960s and 1980s, Latin America 
and China were actively trying to rationalize their cultures, though the results of these 
efforts were modest. 
The rationalization efforts in China and Latin America were driven by the desire 
to emulate the Western countries and not the same differentiated culture that drove the 
rationalization process in Western Europe. We will use the term “differentiated culture” 
to refer to a culture in which people are confronted with conflicting world views (e.g., 
Protestant vs. Catholic) and contrast it with a traditional culture in which everyone 
shares basically the same world views and assumptions.  A differentiated culture was 
found on Western Europe during the sixteenth century, when the Protestant 
Reformation and related religious controversies split the traditional catholic unity of the 
region. A differentiated culture does not provide an adequate level of social integration 
and requires the creation of rational arrangements to assure social order (Cousiño and 
Valenzuela 1994). In Latin America and China the rationalization effort took place in 
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the context of a less differentiated culture and as a result the rationalization process has 
been less pervasive in these regions than in West. 
For example, during the Cultural Revolution (1966-1976) the traditional culture 
was harshly attacked in China: temples were destroyed and Confucianism was declared 
an outdated ideology and popular religion mere superstition. However, starting with the 
1980s there is widespread evidence of a strong revival of traditional religious practices 
and beliefs (Adler 2002; Lagerwey 2004; Overmeyer 2003). Temples are being re-built 
and devotion to local deities continues to thrive. Festivals, rituals, dances, processions, 
communication with supernatural beings, fengshui, and popular medicine are now part 
of ordinary life for many Chinese people. Altars for ancestors and patron deities are 
found in many households. Confucianism remains at the core of the cultural unity of 
China, albeit today more as an ethical philosophy or system of thought than as a formal 
religion.  Similarly, Latin America has not experienced the level of cultural 
differentiation found in Western Europe. Latin American Sociologists argue that Latin 
American culture remains integrated by the values and norms underlying “Marianism” 
(Cousiño 1990; Cousiño and Valenzuela 1994; Morandé 1984). Just to remind, these 
claims should be understood in comparative terms: Latin America and China are strong 
traditional cultures relative to the West. 
It is also important to note that numerous factors other than religion may have 
influenced the modernization pathways. However, describing these factors goes beyond 
the scope of this article. The point that we want to stress here is the disparity between 
the modernization pathways of China and Latin America as opposed to Western 
Europe. 
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To summarize, for the countries under consideration there is a difference in the 
type of cultural and economic transformations that have preceded the challenge of rapid 
population aging and the associated need for pension reform. There has also been a 
difference in the timing of these processes. While numerous Western countries first 
experienced cultural rationalization, next economic modernization, and then faced the 
challenges of population aging and pension policy reform, both Latin America and 
China are dealing with these challenges in the context of much less developed 
economies and stronger traditional cultures (Figure 1).  
 
3. Pension reform in low-income traditional societies 
Latin America and China both have traditional cultures and low-income 
economies. As defined here, a “traditional culture” is organized around three principles: 
family, reciprocity, and loyalty. In comparison, a “rationalized culture” is organized 
around institutions, planning, and legality. In this case the traditional cultures are also 
low-income economies characterized by poverty while the rationalized cultures are 
developed economies characterized by wealth (Table 1). Note that the separation of 
traditional and rational does not imply that traditional cultures are irrational.  
Conflicting principles can coexist in the same culture, but typically one has 
preeminence over other. 
Drawing evidence from Latin America, in this section we argue that the 
modernization pathway preceding the aging challenge in China will shape the challenge 
to the old-age pension system reform in four interrelated areas: coverage, compliance, 
transparency, and fiscal stability (Table 1). 
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3.1 Coverage: Old-Age Pension Institutions and Family 
The effects of the pension reform on coverage rates in Latin America have been 
largely discussed in previous literature (Arenas de Mesa 2000; ECLAC 2006; Gill et al. 
2005; Jiménez and Cuadros 2003; Mesa-Lago 2004; Packard 2002). There is not much 
agreement about what measure of coverage should be used. However, regardless of the 
indicator used, for most of the countries analyzed a substantial fraction of the 
population is left without coverage (Table 2). For a detailed discussion of the reason for 
the discrepancies between these various indicators see Rofman (2005). 
[Insert Table 2 about here] 
As with Latin America, a large fraction of the Chinese population is left without 
coverage. About two-thirds of Chinese workers live in rural areas and in those areas 
only about 11 percent of these workers are covered by a formal-institutional pension 
system. Coverage goes up to 55 percent of the workforce in urban areas, although even 
this level of coverage is insufficient by Western standards. Overall, three out of four 
Chinese workers have no pension coverage at all (Jackson and Howe 2004). 
It is generally agreed by most Chinese policymakers that it is not feasible at this 
point in time to extend coverage by the formal-institutional old-age pension institutions 
to the vast Chinese rural population, despite the high level of rural old-age poverty 
(Williamson and Shen 2004).  Based on analogous pension reform efforts in a number 
of Latin American countries, it does not seem likely that current reform efforts in China 
are going to substantially increase coverage any time soon (Arenas de Mesa 2000; 
ECLAC 2006; Gill et al. 2005; Jiménez and Cuadros 2003; Mesa-Lago 2004; Packard 
2002).  
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Today most Chinese rely heavily on family networks for support. According to 
the 2000 census data, about two-thirds of those age 65 and over live with their children 
(Table 3). This tendency is particularly strong for elderly women living in rural areas. 
The lack of formal-institutional pension coverage for most elderly Chinese and the 
evidence from Latin America suggesting that coverage may not substantially increase 
any time soon, leads us to the conclusion that in China family support is likely to 
remain the primary source of old-age security during the foreseeable future, at least in 
rural areas, where there is virtually no pension coverage.  
[Insert Table 3 about here] 
On the other hand, the projected demographic change for China gives us reason 
to questions the efficacy of the traditional family support system for meeting the 
economic needs of tomorrow’s Chinese elderly (Gubhaju and Moriki-Durand 2003; 
Zeng and Wang 2003). In 1970, the Chinese elderly were outnumbered by children six 
to one, but by 2040 there will be two elderly people for every child (UN 2003).  This 
projected demographic change will place great strain in the traditional family support 
system and suggests that the need for old-age pensions is going to be increasing. 
It is clear that the Chinese elderly will not be able to rely solely on family 
arrangements (World Bank 1997; Friedman et al. 1996). Nonetheless, it is also true that 
family support networks will continue to play a very important role for many of the 
elderly. Examination of recent pension reform efforts in Latin America suggest that the 
family performs a crucial function as a source of support and protection for the elderly, 
given the limited coverage of the pension system in the region (ECLAC 2004) and the 
centrality of the family in the Latin American culture. There is no reason to expect a 
  
14
different outcome in China.  The Confucian ethic of filial piety (xiao) involves respect, 
obedience, gratitude and the obligation to reciprocate for parents having given us life 
and, in comparison to the Western countries, this ethic remains very strong in China 
(Gu and Liang 2000; Sung 2000). It has been motivating children to take care of their 
elderly parents for centuries and will probably continue to play a role for care for the 
elderly long into the future (Zeng and Wang 2003), though increasingly in combination 
with formal old-age pension institutions. 
The assumption made by some analysts that the family support system is going 
to break down places the Chinese case into a conceptual framework better suited to the 
Western Pathway. But that framework overlooks the fact that China continues to be a 
traditional culture and it limits policymakers to considering individualized ways to 
support retirees, relegating the family network of support to a secondary role in the 
policy debate about the reform. 
3.2 Compliance: Individual financial planning and reciprocity 
Closely related to the coverage problem are low compliance rates and low 
contribution densities. One goal of the pension reform in Latin America has been to 
improve incentives for workers to participate in the system and to increase personal 
contributions to their funded accounts. A strengthened “equivalence principle” (a 
linkage between contributions and pension benefits) was expected to get workers to 
view their contributions as investments or savings rather than as a tax. This in turn was 
expected to increase the incentive for participating and contributing to the system 
(World Bank 1994). However, the evidence from Latin American does not point to any 
such trend (Gill et al 2005; Jiménez and Cuadros 2003; Mesa-Lago 2004; Packard 
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2002; Rofman 2005). Evidence presented in Table 4 shows that compliance rates have 
actually decreased in Latin America suggesting that IRAs are not having the expected 
impact on the incentive to contribute.  
[Insert Table 4 about here] 
It is generally agreed both in Latin America and in China that some segments of 
the population are particularly reluctant to contribute. For example, workers in rural 
areas, workers in the informal sector of the economy, and low-wage workers choose 
savings options other than IRAs, such as housing and the education of their children 
(ECLAC 2006; Gill et al. 2005; Kritzer 2000; Mesa-Lago 2004; Packard 2001; Rofman 
2005). 
Why might these groups avoid contributions to a reformed old-age pension 
system if it is clearly strengthened with respect to the “equivalence principle”? We will 
focus on explanations connected to the modernization pathway preceding the reform. 
One potential explanation is that individuals are “irrational”; not contributing to the IRA 
reveals a myopic behavior or short planning horizon (Valdés-Prieto 2002). Here we 
offer an alternative explanation: the preference for the education of one’s children and 
housing over IRAs is a “rational” behavior for an individual in a traditional culture and 
in a low-income economy, where the family is a strong social unit organized around 
reciprocity and affected by poverty. What is considered rational in Latin America and 
China may not be considered rational from the perspective of the Western Pathway. 
Numerous studies in Latin America conclude that contributing to the IRAs is too 
costly, particularly for low-income workers who struggle to meet immediate basic needs 
for survival and face the pressing consumption needs of their families (Barr and 
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Packard 2000; Gill et al. 2005; Jiménez and Cuadros 2003; Kritzer 2000; Mesa-Lago 
2004; Packard 2002). In Figure 4 we present aggregate data that points to a similar 
trend.  We see that compliance rates tend to increase as GDP per capita increases, 
despite evidence of some variation between nations in similar GDP per capita ranges 
(e.g. Mexico versus Uruguay). At the cultural level, contributing to an IRA could 
disrupt the cycle of reciprocity inside a family. By investing in housing and childhood 
education, wealth is shared and transferred among generations in a permanent cycle of 
giving, receiving, and returning (Bataille 1988; Mauss 1967), a dynamic that assures 
family support at older ages. Summing up, in a low-income economy and a culture 
where reciprocity has primacy over individual financial planning, a strengthened 
equivalence principle is likely to have little impact on a worker’s propensity to 
contribute to the system. 
[Insert Figure 4 about here]  
As with Latin-Americans, the Chinese are severely affected by poverty and tend 
to show a lack of enthusiasm for IRAs (Zhao and Xu 2002), but support for the 
principle of reciprocity inside the family (Gu and Liang 2000; Sung 2000; Bengston and 
Putney 2000).  Therefore, it is reasonable to hypothesize that a stronger equivalence 
principle is an insufficient incentive for Chinese workers to contribute. 
Two caveats should be mentioned when assessing ways to increase compliance 
rates in China. First, while the value placed on reciprocity is associated with what we 
call an “ethic of family savings” in China, in Latin American it occurs within an “ethic 
of ritual spending of wealth” (Cousiño 1990; Cousiño and Valenzuela 1994; Morandé 
1984).  In Latin America, reciprocity is extended beyond the family to God and nature.  
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For example, a profuse harvest is comprehended as a gift of nature or a favor from God. 
The spontaneous reaction of people is to greet the benefactor with sacrifices or to spend 
part of the wealth received in a celebration. The popular belief is that human efforts 
cannot succeed without luck or divine support. This belief is confirmed in Latin 
American semantics, where the concepts “earning” and “winning” are indistinct: you 
win a wage as you win a lottery.  This example illustrates Latin Americans’ 
predisposition to spend and share wealth as if it were a prize. Individual financial 
planning is not based on this type of reasoning where wealth is often attributed to God 
or the earth. Such behavior is more typical in cultures that attribute the origin of wealth 
to human work. In Chinese culture this link seems to be stronger, perhaps because land 
is more highly regulated and is perceived as a particularly scarce resource. The Chinese 
more readily save wealth than Latin-Americans, though savings may be for children’s 
prosperity and perpetuating the principle of reciprocity. Even Chinese individuals living 
in foreign countries, where changes in the family support patterns are more prevalent, 
tend to sacrifice part of their personal gain for the well-being of their family (Lan 2002; 
Wong et al. 2006). 
The fact that the equivalence principle could be strengthened a lot more in China 
constitutes a second caveat when assessing ways to increase compliance rates (Dorn 
2004; Zhao and Xu 2002). China has formally based its old-age pension system reform, 
at least in part, on funded IRAs; but in actual practice these IRAs are often closer to the 
NDC (notional [or unfunded] defined contribution) model than to the funded defined 
contribution model (Williamson and Deitelbaum 2004).  The NDC model (also referred 
to as the Non-Financial Defined Contribution model) is explicated in detail elsewhere 
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(Williamson and Zheng 2003; Williamson 2004; Holzmann and Palmer 2006). IRAs 
have been set up and a record is being kept of what has been contributed, but the 
government routinely diverts money from IRAs to pay pensions to the currently retired.  
The discrepancy between pension policy as described in government documents and 
what happens in actual practice, has the unintended effect of contributing to distrust and 
discouraging both participation and compliance. Figure 5 suggests that transparency and 
credibility (high CPI scores) are associated with higher compliance rates. Corruption 
levels in China are similar to those of Argentina and Peru, and most likely have a 
negative effect on compliance rates. 
 [Insert Figure 5 about here] 
3.3 Transparency: Legality and loyalty 
The privatization reforms in Latin America were designed to provide pension 
systems with a high degree of resistance to political manipulation (World Bank 1994). 
However, the economic crisis in Argentina that started in the late 1990s has been 
attributed in part to the deficit created by the old-age pension reform and poor 
management of the funds (Bertranou et al. 2003; Matijascic and Kay 2006; Mesa-Lago 
2004). Argentina deferred its debt by selling bonds to the fund management companies. 
This risky behavior illustrates that the new funded systems are not immune to political 
manipulation and that it is important to invest in asset classes other than just 
government bonds. The case of Bolivia is another good example. Loose regulations led 
to fraudulent interpretations of the rules for the transition, contributing to higher than 
expected costs (Escobar 2003; Gill et al. 2005; Dowers et al. 2001). On the other hand, 
Chile’s better coverage can be attributed, at least in part, to its lower level of corruption.  
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Figure 2 shows the disparity in levels of corruption between Chile and other Latin 
American countries. Chile has a CPI score closer to Belgium and France, while 
Argentina and Bolivia have the lowest scores. China also has low CPI scores; this may 
foreshadow problems with corruption in the funded component of the Chinese pension 
system. 
As discussed earlier (subsection 2.2), a strong and clean legal system is an 
indicator of rationalization. A rationalized set of laws is needed when traditional 
behaviors are unable to provide sufficient social order. In traditional cultures, “loyalty” 
upholds order to a greater extent than “legality” and leads people to provide favors and 
preferential treatment to friends or relatives. When a morality based on personal 
relationships and favors is extended to public institutions, such as the pension system, 
corruption is a high risk (corruption is a judgment made from the reference point of 
legality). Accordingly, in a traditional culture, the shift from family support to the 
support of a formal-institutional pension system —either with or without IRAs —is 
prone to corruption. 
China is particularly vulnerable to corruption for several reasons (Sandholtz 
Taagepera 2005). First, loyalty (zhong) is a longstanding Confucian virtue that 
permeates all social relationships (Adler 2002). Second, mechanisms that facilitate 
regulation and supervision of the pension system have been slow to emerge (Holzmann 
and Hinz 2005). Third, funds are typically invested with low public transparency in a 
context where there is too much money for too few opportunities (Holzmann and Hinz 
2005; Williamson and Shen 2004). Fourth, the money is collected, administered, and 
owned by the government (Dorn 2004; Jackson and Howe 2004; Holzmann and Hinz 
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2005). Consequently, separating these roles, diversifying the investment opportunities, 
carefully establishing and legitimating the regulatory system, creating technical 
organizations of supervision, and enabling greater public access to information about 
fund management are all much needed steps in Chinese pension reform.  
3.4 Fiscal stability: Economic growth and poverty reduction 
One of the major political selling points for the partial privatization of pension 
schemes has been governments’ difficulty with financing the increasing pension burden 
associated with prior PAYG defined benefit schemes. Therefore, the fiscal stability of 
the new systems is fundamental to the credibility of the reforms (Dowers et al. 2001; 
Gill et al. 2005). 
In Latin America the fiscal burden has remained substantial, though it may have 
been even higher, particularly in future decades, without recent reforms. The shift to 
partial privatization typically calls for some form of “double payments”: payments 
associated to the new system, but also payments recognizing benefits and contributions 
for those participating in the old system (Jiménez and Cuadros 2003; Mesa-Lago 2000). 
The transition costs associated with these reforms have typically turned out to be much 
larger and are currently projected to last much longer than had originally been expected.  
Permanent costs may also increase: low rates of compliance could force the government 
to aid more people than initially anticipated through the minimum pension guarantee 
and social assistance pensions. For the region as a whole the cost of social security and 
social assistance taken together increased from 5.2 percent of the GDP in 1990-1991 to 
7.1 percent in 2002-2003 (ECLAC 2005). 
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These costs are likely to be high in China as well. Fiscal difficulties have been a 
problem affecting the Chinese old-age pension system since the 1980s (Bottelier 2002; 
Jackson and Howe 2004; Whiteford 2003; Williamson and Deitelbaum 2005). 
Previously, State-Owned-Enterprises (SOEs) were responsible for providing pensions to 
their retired employees. In the 1980s the finances of the SOEs became deeply strained 
by the transition to a market economy and the governments’ decision to stop 
subsidizing them. Without government support and with a declining number of workers, 
SOEs faced serious difficulties in providing pensions for their former workers.  In 
response to this problem, the Chinese government has called for municipal pooling of 
pension obligations and contributions. This reform largely shifted the financial crisis 
from SOEs to the municipalities. With the 1997 reforms, the pension burden, previously 
shifted from the SOEs to the municipalities, was in part returned to the central 
government.  
China’s long history of fiscal problems its pension system and the evidence of 
pervasive fiscal problems associated with the new privatization related reforms in Latin 
America suggest that the pension related fiscal burden will continue to be a major 
challenge for pension reformers in China. 
China’s weak fiscal situation in the years preceding recent reforms raises 
concerns about how the nation will deal with the impending cost of the transition. 
Figure 6 illustrates the fiscal situation of Chile, Argentina, and China in the years 
preceding the privatization related reforms. Argentina dramatically underestimated the 
cost of the transition, and during its recent economic crisis paid a heavy price for this 
mistake. In Chile the transition cost was also very high (about 5.7 percent of annual 
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GDP during the 1980s and 1990s), but the general fiscal surplus was very helpful in 
dealing with this burden (Acuña e Iglesias 2001; Betranou 2003; Gill et al. 2005; Mesa-
Lago 2000). Figure 6 shows that China is in a comparatively weak position to handle 
the fiscal pressures of the reform. 
[Insert Figure 6 about here] 
Finding a way to finance the pension system is a problem for most countries 
around the world, but this problem become particularly acute for low-income countries, 
such as China and those in Latin America. However, there is an important difference 
between China and Latin America. The Chinese government has called for a new 
pension system that is based in part on funded IRAs, but due to lack of alternative ways 
to raise the money needed to pay promised pensions to those who are currently retired, 
these “funded” accounts are today for the most part unfunded. The money has been 
used, typically by the local government to pay pensions to those who are already retired, 
leaving little more than electronic records in the accounts of individual workers 
specifying that they have made specific “contributions” to their account and the level of 
the unfunded balances in those accounts. In practice, China is using a variant of 
“notional accounts” as a financing strategy for the pension system (Williamson 2004; 
Williamson and Shen 2004; Williamson and Zheng 2003). The discrepancy between the 
formal structure of the program and what is actually going on must be contributing to 
mistrust of the government and to a lack of confidence in the pension system. It must 
also be reducing the incentive to contribute and increasing the incentive to evade paying 
into the scheme. However, there are advantages to the NDC model when properly 
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designed as the model does help to spread the transition costs over more age cohorts 
and it does tend to reduce administrative costs. 
Low-income countries face difficulties as they try to balance the aims of 
fostering economic growth and poverty reduction as they reform their pension schemes. 
It is generally assumed that the main objective for an old-age pension system is to 
provide at least some financial security for the elderly. In those countries with many 
elderly in or at risk of poverty, the need for income redistribution becomes particularly 
salient. Minimum and non-contributive pensions can be used to help with redistribution 
and poverty reduction, but they do not maximize the equivalence principle and do 
increase the cost of the system (Gill et al. 2005; Holzmann and Hinz 2005; Johnson and 
Williamson 2006; Jiménez and Cuadros 2003; Matijascic and Kay 2006; Mesa-Lago 
2004a). 
 
4. Conclusion  
While numerous Western countries first experienced cultural rationalization, 
then economic modernization, and after that faced the challenges of population aging, 
both Latin America and China are dealing with pension system reforms in the context of 
much stronger traditional cultures and less developed economies (Figure 1). The 
analysis presented in this article suggests that these distinctive characteristics have 
shaped the consequences of the reforms in Latin America and will likely do so in China.  
Specific challenges arise in the context of a traditional culture and a low-income 
economy where society is organized around the principles of family, reciprocity, 
loyalty, and poverty (Table 1). One of the most predictable challenges will be the 
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coverage problem. Most Chinese elderly are not covered by formal old-age pension 
institutions and currently rely only on traditional family support. There is no evidence 
from the Latin American countries that have introduced pension reforms calling for 
partial privatization suggesting that coverage for the Chinese system is likely to 
approach universality in the foreseeable future. Therefore, the family unit, the 
traditional source of well-being at older ages, seems likely to continue being the major 
pillar of the old-age security, particularly in rural areas. However, in the decades ahead 
the Chinese elderly will with increasing frequency find that their families are not in a 
position to provide the needed support. The need for formal-institutional pension 
coverage will be increasing rapidly in the years ahead. A key question will be whether 
the recent reforms calling for partial privatization will in the end undermine or 
strengthen traditional family networks of support and filial piety. 
Low compliance rates are another major challenge for China. Although 
incentives to contribute have improved, the current low compliance rates point to a 
preference for old-age security based on reciprocity (e.g. investments on children’s 
education) rather than individual financial planning. Strengthening the “equivalence 
principle” that links contributions and benefits could stimulate compliance for some. 
Nevertheless, those used to living in poverty, particularly in rural areas, may resist 
efforts to encourage individual financial planning and may prefer to sacrifice part of 
their modest wealth for the family. It would make sense for policy makers to adjust 
incentives in such a way as to take into consideration historical, cultural, and contextual 
factors.  
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Corruption and lack of transparency aggravate the coverage and compliance 
problems and constitute yet another challenge for the Chinese reforms. Where loyalty 
has primacy over legality, corruption and lack of transparency are likely outcomes. 
Favors are expected in a traditional culture, but such favors are considered corruption in 
a modern institutional context. Carefully designing, fully legitimating, and cautiously 
implementing the regulatory system and supervisory institutions are important steps to 
improve transparency and credibility.  
Another foreseeable challenge for the Chinese reform is the fiscal burden. How 
to finance the reform and to balance the objectives of economic growth and poverty 
reduction are major questions almost everywhere, but low-income countries such as 
China face additional difficulties. The empty IRAs, which were supposed to accumulate 
funds, are likely to increase distrust of government and of government sponsored old-
age security schemes. It might make sense for Chinese policy makers to introduce a 
system based on unfunded defined contribution accounts at least until it is clear that 
national financial markets and administrative structures are ready for the demands of a 
partially privatized social security system.  
The nations in Latin America under consideration here have not succeeded with 
respect to coverage and compliance. In addition, transparency and fiscal stability are far 
from certain. This evidence suggests that without some major changes in the current 
policy direction, China may be headed for potentially serious pension policy problems 
in these four areas. The modernization pathway preceding old-age pension reform in 
China will likely shape the process and outcomes in these four areas. Chinese 
policymakers might well benefit from a close analysis of the flaws that are starting to 
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become clear in connection with the new partially funded pension schemes that have 
been introduced in Latin America in recent years.  
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Table 1. Modernization pathways and areas of challenge for old-age pension system reform.
China and Latin America 1 Western Countries Old-Age Pension Reform
Family (xiao ) Institutions Coverage
Reciprocity (chung ) Individual Planning compliance
Loyalty (zhong ) Legality Transparency
Poverty Wealth Fiscal stability
1 The pinyin  system of Romanization has been used for Chinese terms for Confucian virtues.  
 
 
Table 2. In Latin America pension system reform has left a substantial fraction of the population without coverage.1
Coverage before the reform Coverage after the reform
Country
Contributors/              
Economically Active 
Population               
(year)
Contributors/            
Economically Active 
Population2                      
(2002)
Contributors/        
Employed Persons2    
(2000-2003)
Contributors/       
Wage-Earners2         
(2000-2003)
Benficiaries/         
Population Age 65+3   
(2000-2003)
Chile 0.64 (1980) 0.58 0.63 0.77 0.64
Argentina 0.50 (1994) 0.26 0.40  4 0.55  4 0.68  4
Mexico 0.37 (1997) 0.33 0.39 0.62 0.19
Uruguay 0.32 (1997) 0.45 0.65  4 0.79  4 0.87  4
Colombia 0.32 (1993) 0.18  -  - 0.19
Peru 0.31 (1993) 0.12 0.14 0.31 0.24
El Salvador 0.26 (1996) 0.22 0.32 0.53 0.15
Bolivia 0.12 (1996) 0.11 0.11 0.29 0.15
1 Adapted from AIOS 2005; Mesa-Lago 2005; and Rofman 2005.
Other indicators of coverage after the reform
2 These measurements could overestimate coverage for workers doing sporadic contributions, or underestimate coverage for workers not doing contributions but 
covered by non-contributory pensions.
3 This measurement could underestimate coverage for spouses of beneficiaries, for individuals who continue working and delayed the benefits, and individuals 
receiving non-contributive benefits.
4 Information for urban areas.  
 36
 
 
Table 3. The majority of Chinese elders live with their children.1
Rural Urban Rural-urban combined
Males
Living alone 8.7 7.7 8.4
With spouse only 26.3 33.7 28.8
With spouse & other, not with children 0.7 0.8 0.7
With spouse and children 36.5 39.0 37.4
With children, not with spouse 25.6 16.8 22.6
With others, not with spouse and children 1.9 1.3 1.7
Institution 0.3 0.7 0.4
Grand total 100.0 100.0 100.0
   Subtotal of living with spouse 63.5 73.5 66.9
   Subtotal of living with children 62.1 55.8 59.9
Females
Living alone 9.8 12.4 10.7
With spouse only 17.9 21.3 19.1
With spouse & other, not with children 0.3 0.6 0.4
With spouse and children 22.8 21.7 22.4
With children, not with spouse 48.1 42.6 46.2
With others, not with spouse and children 0.9 1.0 0.9
Institution 0.2 0.4 0.3
Grand total 100.0 100.0 100.0
   Subtotal of living with spouse 41.0 43.6 41.9
   Subtotal of living with children 70.9 64.4 68.7
1 Living arrangements for Chinese population aged 65 and over, rural urban comparison, year 2000. Adapted from Zeng and 
Wang 2003.  
 
 
 
Table 4. Compliance rates have declined in Latin America.1
Country 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005
Argentina 48.9 44.3 39.1 29.0 33.2 35.2 35.4 40.3
Bolivia - - - 47.0 46.9 39.0 44.9 47.5
Chile 52.8 53.4 50.9 53.7 51.0 51.9 50.4 51.2
Colombia2 - 51.6 48.5 48.7 47.6 48.7 49.5 50.6
El Salvador 67.2 63.8 53.5 53.2 47.6 46.3 41.9 39.5
Mexico3 63.4 60.2 57.9 44.7 41.7 39.3 38.8 37.6
Peru 45.6 45.7 41.7 41.2 39.4 41.9 39.9 36.2
Uruguay 67.4 58.7 53.9 53.2 45.1 52.7 52.5 55.7
1 Percentage of affiliates who contributed in the past month to IRAs, December 1998-2005. Source: Mesa-Lago 2005 and AIOS 
2005.
2  In 1993-2003 contributor was an affiliate who had at least one contribution in the last six months. 
3 In 1999-2003 contributor was an affiliate who had at least one contribution in the past two months.  
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Figure 1. The challenge of population aging for the pension system has come 
through dissimilar modernization pathways. 
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Figure 2. Western countries are perceived as less corrupt than China and Latin 
America.
Note: CPI Score ranks countries according to experts’ perception of corruption, and ranges between 0 (highly corrupt) and 10 
(highly clean). China excluding Hong-Kong SAR.
Source: Transparency International 2005.
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Figure 3. The western pathway is characterized by wealth.
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Figure 4. Coverage is larger in wealthier countries.
Source: Author's calculations based on AIOS 2005;IMF 2005; Mesa-Lago 2005, Rofman 2005, and Transparency
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Figure 5. Coverage is larger in countries with better CPI score (less corrupt).
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Figure 6. The fiscal strength prior to the reform is key to overstep its costs.
 
 
